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Article
Transfer of Sovereignty over Populated
Territories from Israel to a Palestinian
State: The International Law Perspective
Yoram Rabin & Roy Peled*
One proposal suggested for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is the redrawing of the border between Israel and the
future Palestinian State to include those territories densely
populated by Palestinian citizens of Israel, west of the "green
line," within the Palestinian State. The suggestion has stirred
lively debate in Israel. This Article examines the idea of the
transfer of sovereignty over populated territories from Israel to
Palestine in light of international law. Following a discussion of
historical precedent, international conventions, and
international court decisions, it concludes that Israel has the
right, from the international law perspective, to modify its
borders, through agreement with a future Palestinian State.
Nonetheless, international law does impose some strict
conditions for the implementation of such a treaty. The most
important of these is granting a "right of option" to the Israeli
citizens in the transferred territory. The authors argue that
Israel will be expected to grant a "broad" right of option, i.e.,
allow the affected persons to choose to move and live within
Israel's new borders or to remain in their current residences
* Yoram Rabin, JSD, Tel Aviv University; Senior Lecturer, School of Law, The
College of Management Academic Studies Division. Roy Peled, LL.B., The
Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya; LL.M. Student, Law Faculty, Tel Aviv
University. The authors would like to express their thanks to (in alphabetical order)
Ruth Gavison, Eyal Gross, Alex Jacobson, Nathan Lerner, Liav Orgad, Ehud
Prawer, Itzhak Reiter, Amnon Rubinstein, Ilan Saban, Yuval Shany, and Maya
Steinitz. The Journal relies upon the authors for the accuracy of Hebrew language
sources, which are indicated in the corresponding notes.
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while continuing to maintain their Israeli citizenship.
FOREWORD
The U.N. General Assembly's November 29, 1947 decision'
regarding the partition of Palestine between Arabs and Jews
triggered the outbreak of the war over Palestine. The war,
which lasted eighteen months, concluded with the Arab world's
failure to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel. In
1949, a string of cease-fire agreements between Israel and its
neighbors came into effect, including the general armistice
agreement between Israel and Jordan, commonly referred to as
the Rhodes Agreement.2 Within the framework of the Rhodes
Agreement, cease-fire lines were drawn that would eventually
become known as the green line. The green line functioned
effectively as an international border that guaranteed clear
separation between the populations on each side.' Portions of
the green line coincided with or approximated Palestine's border
during the British mandate,4 whereas other portions-in the
Gaza Strip, Judea, and Samaria-significantly differed from the
lines drawn in the 1947 U.N. partition agreement. The Rhodes
Agreement assigned to Israel control over a strip of territory
that included a string of Arab villages and towns extending from
Umm el-Fahm in the north to Kafr Kassem in the south. The
border's modifications significantly increased the number of
Arabs who found themselves under Israeli control and
somewhat blurred the ethnic separation that characterized the
war's outcome.
In recent years, various proposals to solve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict have been a part of the Israeli political
discourse. The majority of these proposals are based on the "two
states" solution: the division of Mandatory Palestine into two
nation-states-one Palestinian, the other Jewish-based on
1. G.A. Res. 181(11), U.N. DOc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947).
2. See Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement, Apr. 3, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 303.
3. The parties to the agreement specifically declared that they did not view
the line as political, but rather the product of military constraints. Id. art. 11(2) ("It
is also recognised that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the
rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful
settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated
exclusively by military considerations.").
4. Between 1917 and 1948, Palestine was under the rule of the United
Kingdom pursuant to the mandate Britain received from the League of Nations after
World War I.
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mutual recognition by each party of the other's right to live in
an autonomous, sovereign state.' Two principles are shared by
almost all the proposals: first, the Rhodes Agreement and the
green line are treated as starting points for the determination of
a permanent border between the two states; and second, in
recognition of the reality that has been created in the field,
especially after Israel's occupation of the West Bank in the 1967
Six-Day War, adjustment of the green line is warranted.6 Such
adjustments are likely to shift territory now found to the west or
north of the green line to the future Palestinian state, and
territory now found to the east or south of that same line to
Israel.
Among these proposals, several were offered in which
adjustment of the green line would entail the transfer of
territory to the future Palestinian state that was populated by
those Palestinians whose homes and villages were placed within
Israel's borders by the Rhodes Agreement, and have
subsequently become citizens of Israel. These proposals were
originally raised by academics.7 Proximate to the 2003 general
5. This solution is widely accepted by the international community as it
resembles the basis of the 1947 partition program. See ALEX JACOBSON & AMNON
RUBINSTEIN, YISRA'EL U-MISHPAHAT HE-'AMIM-MEDINAT LE'OM YEHUDIT U-
ZEKHUYOT HA-ADAM [ISRAEL AND THE FAMILY OF NATIONS-THE JEWISH NATION-
STATE AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 24-44 (2003) (Hebrew); Ruth Gavison, Implications of
Seeing Israel as Jewish (and Democratic) State (Ctr. for the Study of Rationality,
Jerusalem, Isr.) Feb. 2005 (Hebrew), available at http://ratio.huji.ac.il/dp/dp383.pdf.
6. The need to recognize the demographic reality created in the field and to
consider this reality within the framework of negotiations for a permanent
settlement have been discussed during negotiations between the two sides, as well
as after the talks at Camp David in 2000, in hopes of introducing stability into the
area by maintaining national majorities in the two nation-states. The necessity of
taking such a step also appears in the letter dated April 14, 2004, addressed from
the President of the United States, George W. Bush, to Israel's former Prime
Minister, Ariel Sharon. The contents of the letter were confirmed by both houses of
the U.S. Congress and reflect the administration's position. Letter from George W.
Bush, President, U.S., to Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister, Isr. (Apr. 14, 2004),
available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOlArchive/Speeches/2004/04/Speeches9340.
htm.
7. See ARNON SOFER, ISRAEL: DEMOGRAPHY, 2000-2020: DANGERS AND
OPPORTUNITIES (2001); Sergio Della Pergola, Demographic Trends in Israel and
Palestine: Prospects and Policy Implications, 103 AM. JEWISH Y.B. 3 (2003); Uzi
Arad, Swap Meet: Trading Land for Peace (Israeli-Palestinian Dispute), NEW
REPUBLIC, Nov. 28, 2005, at 16; Uzi Arad, Territorial Exchanges and the Two-State
Solution for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (Aug. 2005) (working paper, submitted to
the Herzeliya Conference, Jan. 21-24, 2006). For the first comprehensive attempt to
analyze these proposals, see SHAUL ARIELI, DOUBI SCHWARTZ & HADAS TAGARI,
INJUSTICE AND FOLLY: ON THE PROPOSALS TO CEDE ARAB LOCALITIES FROM ISRAEL
TO PALESTINE (2006), http://fips.org.il/Fips/Site/System/UpLoadFiles/DGallery/
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elections, however, a similar program was proposed by a
political party, and aroused harsh responses, clearly divided
along partisan lines. The harshness of the criticism could not be
divorced from the identity of the party that had incorporated
this program within its platform: Israel Beiteynu, chaired by
Avigdor Lieberman! Irrespective of the proposals' current
political coloration, the authors of this article believe that they
are worthy of further consideration, in isolation from the
political arena.
In international law, the transfer of sovereignty over
territories from one state to another is known as "state
succession." Two interrelated features characterize the issue of
state succession in populated territories. The first, judicial in
nature, pertains to the step's legality; the second, moral-ethical
in essence, deals with the step's appropriateness, worth, or
wisdom. Despite this complexity, the present article confines
itself to the judicial aspects of the proposals raised.9 Such a
discussion is likely to develop along two dimensions: that of
international law and that of constitutional law of the respective
parties to the agreement. We focus here on international law.
Israeli constitutional law raises additional intricate questions of
fact and law; it therefore requires a separate discussion. In our
conclusions we will state some of the issues that we anticipate
will arise in a discussion conducted from the perspective of
constitutional law.
Two questions rest at the core of our discussion: the first
Injustice.pdf; Yuval Shany, A Mixed Blessing: On Exchange of Populated Territories
and Self-Determination-A Comment to 'The Blessing of Departure, J.L. & ETHICS
HUM. RTS. (forthcoming), available at http://www.rg-law.ac.illworkshops/2007/
articles/shany.pdf; Timothy William Waters, The Blessing of Departure Exchanged
Populated Territories: The Lieberman Plan as an Abstract Exercise in Demographic
Transformation, J.L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. (forthcoming), available at http://www.rg-
law.ac.il]workshops/2007/articles/waters.pdf.
8. For the party's platform, see Israel Beytenu, http://beytenu.org (last visited
Oct. 13, 2007). Lieberman, an Israeli politician of Russian origin and founder of this
ultra-right wing party is known as an extreme nationalist; hence, the identification
of the idea of territorial exchanges with his persona clearly marked who would
support or oppose the program.
9. The proposals noted above pertain to the exchange of territories in the
Wadi Ara and Triangle regions. The current article does not deal with the
possibility of territorial exchanges in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Such
transfers-to a Palestinian state and to Syria, respectively-raise questions similar
to those discussed in this article. Nonetheless, the potential differences between the
status of areas' residents (whether or not they accepted Israeli citizenship) and those
of Palestinian citizens of Israel, as well as the possible legal status of the territories
in question, require special consideration and research.
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relates to whether within the framework of border-delineating
treaties, country A is entitled to transfer territory populated by
its citizens to the sovereignty of country B, and if so, under what
conditions can such an action take place? Second, what are the
implications, if any, of such actions for the civil status of the
inhabitants of the respective territory?
The thesis presented here is that from the perspective of
international law, nothing in principle can prevent a mutual
agreement between the State of Israel and a future Palestinian
state altering the border beyond the green line, or proscribe an
act of state succession in the populated territories for the
purpose of transferring those territories from one side to the
other. Numerous cases of state succession in populated
territories have transpired, many of which involved democratic
states; therefore, they cannot be considered unusual or
manifestly undemocratic. In order for such a step to be
implemented, however, modern international law demands that
several especially rigid conditions be met, the heart of which is a
dual right of option that should be available to the residents of
the transferred territory: first, the right of option to remain in
the sovereign territory of the State of Israel; second, the
possibility of retaining Israeli citizenship should an individual
wish to remain in the territory to be transferred to the future
Palestinian state.
The conclusion we reach is that in all instances of state
succession, the population cannot be forcibly transferred with
territory to another state's sovereignty. Given that the
succession is a demographically oriented measure meant to
sustain Israel's Jewish majority, the duty to comply with these
conditions, as stipulated by international law, is likely to
considerably weaken the prospects of realizing the proposals'
declared intentions. Further, the future Palestinian state's
agreement to the action is among the requisite (pre)conditions
for the exchange of territories. We can assume that the
likelihood of reaching a consensus on these conditions depends
considerably on the positions taken by those Arab citizens of
Israel residing in the respective areas.' °
10. Proposals voiced referred to exchanges of populated territory on the two
sides of the border-of "Palestinian" territory to Israel and of Israeli territory to the
future Palestinian state. In order to simplify this highly complex debate, we ignore
the possibility that the territories to be transferred to Israel in the framework of an
agreement are likely to contain Palestinian (subjects of the Palestinian Authority) in
addition to Jewish inhabitants.
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I. STATE SUCCESSION BETWEEN NATIONS
Instances of state succession by means of peaceful border
changes, including the transfer of sovereignty over populated
territories, are much more common than one might assume.
During the last 200 years-a period witnessing consolidation of
the European nation-state-more than 350 such changes were
introduced." The basic feature shared by all these cases is that
when a territory under the sovereignty of country A is
transferred to the sovereignty of country B, in the majority of
cases, the territory's population is not given the opportunity to
democratically influence the process. As might be expected,
significant factors distinguish the cases, whether they be the
historical circumstances, the size of the population affected, or
the relationships maintained between the inhabitants of the
territory about to undergo succession with the respective
countries, to name a few. Instances of state succession under
conditions of decolonization are obviously very different than
instance of state succession between two independent states.
The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect
of Treaties defines state succession as "the replacement of one
State by another in the responsibility for the international
relations of territory[.]' 2  Subsequent international documents
dealing with state succession issues have employed the same
definition. 3  The proposed scenarios regarding transfer of
sovereignty from Israel to the future Palestinian state in areas
west and north of the green line also comply with this definition;
11. For a detailed survey of such cases, see ARIE MARCELO KACOWICZ,
PEACEFUL TERRITORIAL CHANGE (1994). The author lists 327 cases of state
succession prior to 1990. Further, during the 1990s, many instances of such changes
were made following the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of Yugoslavia;
whereas in other parts in the world, border modifications were determined within
the framework of arrangements to end international disputes.
12. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art. 2,
para. i(b), Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Convention on Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties].
13. See G.A. Res. 55/153, annex art. 2, U.N. DOC A/RES/55/153 (Jan. 30, 2001);
European Convention on Nationality, explanatory report art. 104 (1997) (ETS No.
166) [hereinafter European Convention on Nationality] (using the phrase "territorial
relations" instead of "relations of territory"); European Commission for Democracy
Through Law, Declaration on the Consequences of State Succession for the
Nationality of Natural Persons art. I, para. 2 (CDL-INF, 1997, 001E) (Sept. 13-14,
1996) [hereinafter Venice Declaration]; Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts art. 2, para. 1(a), Apr. 8, 1983, 22
I.L.M. 306 [hereinafter Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property, Archives and Debts].
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it therefore appears that the international law of state
succession should be applied to this case.
As stated, each incident of state succession is unique. Some
involve the separation of a territory from an existing state-as
in the case of East Timor-while others occur within the
framework of decolonization-as in the case of Algeria. Some
cases refer to the partition of one country into two or more
states, as in the cases of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The
proposals discussed in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian case
apparently belong to the category where sovereignty in a given
area is consensually transferred between two states.
When deciding territorial disputes between states, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, like the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, also in The Hague, has in
several cases issued rulings that caused the transfer of
sovereignty over a given area from one state to another. The
court was not ignorant of the implications of state succession for
the inhabitants in the areas affected (especially when the
respective territory was populated). Such an instance occurred
in 1992, when the court was asked to rule on the border dispute
regarding the Bolsones region, lying between El Salvador and
Honduras. 4 Its review of the circumstances revealed that in
some portions of the disputed territory, it was patently clear
which of the two states practiced effective sovereignty, provided
services, and granted citizenship to its population. With respect
to each of those areas, one of the states concerned argued that
the historic boundaries of the Spanish Empire required that the
area effectively ruled by the other, be transferred to its
sovereignty. The court was alert to the fact that its decision
would impose a new sovereign power on the areas' inhabitants
against their will. In the court's words, "the situation may arise
in some areas whereby a number of the nationals of one Party
will ... find themselves living in the territory of the other ... " "
14. The court was required to decide where the border between the two states
passed. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.: Nicar.
Intervening) 1992 I.C.J. 351, 380 (Sept. 11).
15. Id. at 400. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission decided another
case of state succession regarding populated territory. Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary
Commission: Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border Between the State of
Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Eri. v. Eth.), Apr. 13,
2002, 41 I.L.M. 1057. The boundary adjustment resulted in the transfer to Eritrea
of territory under the effective control of Ethiopia. Id. This area was populated by
the Irob tribe, which considered itself as belonging to Ethiopia. The tribe protested
the border adjustment. See IRROB.org, Irob Relief and Rehabilitation Operations
Brotherhood Inc., http://www.irrob.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2007). Professor W.
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Another ICJ decision regarding an event of state succession
addressed the border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria
over the Bakassi peninsula, an oil-rich region under Nigerian
control, whose inhabitants were Nigerian citizens of Nigerian
origin. 6 The court ruled that sovereignty over the peninsula
was to be immediately transferred from Nigeria to Cameroon
even though hundreds of thousands of Nigerians are said to live
in the area. 7 Implementation of the decision was completed
only recently; on August 14, 2006, the area was transferred to
Cameroon in a military ceremony. Details of the succession
were fulfilled according to the agreement signed between the
presidents of the two states under the auspices of the U.N.
Secretary-General on June 12, 2006. I8
A previous case of consensual state succession of populated
territory arose in 1997, when the United Kingdom transferred
its sovereignty over Hong Kong to China. Part of the area
transferred had been under British rule by virtue of a leasing
agreement signed between the two states in 1898, whereas the
other part had been conquered by Britain years earlier. As the
lease agreement's expiration approached, Britain decided that it
had no reason to retain the conquered part of the territory and
chose to transfer it to China despite the local inhabitants'
objections.9
To summarize, no legal document limits, in principle, the
right of states to introduce consensually-concluded adjustments
Michael Reisman, a member of the Boundary Commission, wrote that despite the
great general interest in the problem of citizenship raised by the transfer of an
area's inhabitants, the issue must be decided solely by the countries involved. E-mail
from W. Michael Reisman to Roy Peled (Apr. 26, 2006) (on file with author).
16. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon
v. Nig.: Eq. Guinea Intervening) 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10).
17. See Ruben de Koning, Bearing the Bakassi: Local Livelihoods and Natural
Resource Management Under Military Stalemate 2 (2006) (paper, presented at the
Gecorev Symposium, University of Versailles, June 26-28, 2006), available at
http://www.c3ed.uvsq.fr/cdgecorev/fr/pdf/t2/DeKoning.pdf.
18. See Press Release, Department of Public Relations, Nigeria, Cameroon Sign
Agreement Ending Decades-Old Border Dispute; Sets Procedures for Nigerian
Withdrawal from Bakassi Peninsula, U.N. DOC. AFRJ1397 (June 12, 2006).
19. We should note here that as a result of the state succession, the local
inhabitants acquired Chinese citizenship in place of their lost British citizenship. In
response to heavy political pressure, Britain passed a law permitting the respective
Hong Kong inhabitants to request and receive a new British civil status, created
especially for them, that cannot be inherited. For a history of British rule in Hong
Kong and the state succession to China, see FRANK WELSH, A HISTORY OF HONG
KONG (1993). For a detailed description of the negotiations between China and
Great Britain regarding the succession, see ROGER BUCKLEY, HONG KONG: THE
ROAD TO 1997, at 104-126 (1997).
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to their mutual borders. The historical precedents, a few of
which are mentioned here, cover a wide range of state
succession cases. The international covenants that systematize
the outcomes of these measures in effect represent an additional
indicator of the lack of legal barriers to state succession.
Nonetheless, strict conditions applied to state succession of
populated territory do exist. As we shall see, these restrictions
emerge from the practices introduced during the human rights
era, born in the wake of World War II.
The core question we explore is: Can these conditions be
imposed on the Israeli-Palestinian case? Generally speaking,
the international community views the green line as a border
demarcating the territory belonging to the State of Israel, the
contours of which will determine the borders of the future
Palestinian state.2 °  Accordingly, from the perspective of
international law, there is nothing to prevent a potential
agreement between the State of Israel and a future Palestinian
state regarding any potential border adjustments (revisions to
the green line), including the transfer of populated territories
from one party to the other.
II. THE STATUS OF REFERENDUMS REGARDING STATE
SUCCESSION AGREEMENTS
In the debate on state succession in populated territories
executed through agreements between autonomous states, it
has been frequently argued in public debate that the territory's
population should be allowed to express its preferences by
means of a referendum. Such an instrument may produce
significant political and civil advantages.2 ' Irrespective of the
validity of these arguments, the crucial question in the current
20. See S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. SJRES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967); S.C. Res. 338, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/338 (Oct. 22, 1973). It has been reinforced by International Court of
Justice opinions with respect to the separation wall, which in effect recognizes the
green line as a border. See Legal Consequences of the Construction by Israel of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 (July
9); Eyal Benvenisti, The Hague Recognizes the Green Line, HAARETZ, July 12, 2004,
at 2B (Hebrew).
21. For a survey on the use of referendums for determining sovereignty in
territories under contention, see Gary Sussman, When the Demos Shape the Polis-
The Use of Referendums in Settling Sovereignty Issues, available at
http://iandrinstitute.org/Studies.htm. For an international survey of referendums
conducted on territorial issues-including state succession-between 1552 and 1993,
see REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
285-295 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994).
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context is whether the holding of a referendum as a condition in
the state succession of populated territories is in fact required
by international law. Such a requirement could derive from
three different sources: a covenant, decisions handed down by
an international tribunal (considered a secondary source
because precedents have no binding force in international law),
or customary international law.
Regarding the primary source, we can state quite simply
that no international covenant, whether general or regional in
scope, has yet been articulated that requires holding a
referendum where sovereignty is transferred between states.
With respect to the secondary sources (decisions), the two
examples previously cited were taken from ICJ decisions
handed down during the past fifteen years; both state
successions were carried out in the absence of any consultation
with the affected populations. It is interesting to note that
Nigeria's Constitutional Court is reviewing an appeal presented
by Nigerian nationals from the Bakassi Peninsula (transferred
to Cameroon, as described in the preceding), which contends
that the treaty signed between the governments of Cameroon
and Nigeria regarding implementation of the ICJ decision is
null and void on two grounds: first, that it violates international
law because the decision to impose Cameroon's sovereignty was
made without any consultation with the residents; and second,
that the decision runs contrary to the Constitution of Nigeria
because it was not ratified by the parliament.22 A judgment is
expected shortly, although it is doubtful that the local court will
nullify an agreement reached under U.N. auspices for the
purpose of implementing an ICJ decision.
The third source that can support the requirement to hold a
referendum in situations of state succession in populated
territories is customary international law. The conventional
method for considering some behavior as a legal custom is
described in Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice: in deciding disputes according to international
law, "international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law[,]" shall apply.23 According to the article's
interpretation, in international law, a legal principle can emerge
22. See Laurence Ani, Bakassi: Cameroon Takes Charge, Nigeria Lowers Flag,
THIS DAY, Aug. 15, 2006, available at http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=
55766.
23. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1060, available at http://www.globelaw.com/icjstat.htm.
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as a compulsory customary rule when: (1) the legal principle
enjoys agreement among states, expressed in the practices of
those states that have anchored it in their laws; and (2) this
behavior flows from a sense of national commitment to the
compulsory features (opiniojuris) of that custom.24
After the conclusion of World War I, the referendum became
more popular as an instrument for resolving border adjustment
disputes. 5 Referendums came to be incorporated in numerous
arrangements within the framework of the Treaty of
Versailles.26 Nonetheless, even in this period, the majority of
changes in territorial sovereignty were decided without
consulting the affected population.2 7 One precedent from this
period is the referendum held in the region of Schleswig, located
between Germany and Denmark. For purposes of voting, the
region was divided in two, the northern and central regions;
80% of central Schleswig's residents voted to remain part of
Germany whereas 75% of the region's northern residents voted
to transfer sovereignty to Denmark. In the predominantly
German communities among the north's rural population,
however, 75% voted to remain part of Germany.28 Despite their
preference, the entire region was transferred to Denmark.
Although the decision was made on the basis of majority vote,
we note that Danish sovereignty was imposed on the German
minority.
Surprisingly, the referendum's status declined after World
War II; contrary to previous practice, treaties signed after the
war usually did not stipulate the holding of a referendum to
24. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 64, 66 (3d ed. 1997).
25. See MARKKU SUKSI, BRINGING IN THE PEOPLE: A COMPARISON OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FORMS AND PRACTICES OF THE REFERENDUM 243 (1993).
26. See Treaty of Versailles, June 29, 1919, 42 Stat. 1939 [hereinafter Treaty of
Versailles].
27. SUKSI, supra note 25, at 243.
28. The Prussians had conquered the Danish region of Schleswig in 1864.
Following World War I, the Treaty of Versailles stipulated that the region's future
would be determined in a referendum. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 26, art. 109.
Two referendums were held in 1920. It is interesting to note that whereas central
Schleswig allowed every individual village and town to express its wish as to
incorporation into Denmark or to remain in Germany (all chose to remain German),
northern Schleswig declared itself to be a unitary zone. This decision led to a
situation where villages and towns having a majority of German residents voted to
remain in Germany but were forced to accept Danish sovereignty because the
majority of voters in the zone, taken as a whole, were Danish. See Jorgen Ktihl, The
National Minorities in the Danish-German Border Region 9-10,
http://www.jur.ku.dk/Balticlaw/PDF/Kuehl.PDF (last visited Oct. 28, 2007).
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decide border adjustments and state succession.29
Before concluding this segment of the discussion, we find it
appropriate to devote some space to a brief review of selected,
fairly recent cases of state succession that entailed referendums
as core components. All the cases were decided in democratic
countries.
The Rock of Gibraltar, originally ruled by Spain, was
captured by Britain in 1704 during the War of the Spanish
Succession. In 1713, Spain officially and consensually ceded
Gibraltar to Britain within the framework of the Treaty of
Utrecht.3" Article 10 of the treaty stipulated that should Britain
decide to free itself of the responsibilities of exercising
sovereignty over Gibraltar, the first right to sovereignty over the
territory would be offered to Spain. The introduction to the
Gibraltar Constitution Order of 1969, however, states that Her
Majesty's government would never be party to any such
arrangement unless Gibraltar's residents freely and
democratically expressed their acquiescence to the succession.31
During the 1960s, Spain began to demand return of the
territory, based on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514,32
pertaining to the granting of independence to territories under
colonial control. Among other things, the resolution stated that
any injury to the national unity and territorial integrity of a
nation contradicted the U.N. Charter. In response, Britain held
a referendum in 1966 among Gibraltar's residents, which
resulted in a 99.5% vote against the peninsula's transfer to
Spanish sovereignty." The referendum was denounced by the
29. SUKSI, supra note 25, at 248.
30. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Gr. Brit.-Spain, July 13, 1713, available at
http://www.gibnet.com/texts/utrecht.htm (includes English, Latin, and Spanish
translations).
31. GIBRALTAR CONST. ORDER 1969, available at http://www.gibnet.com/texts/
gibcon.pdf. The opening paragraph of the British Order that adopts the Gibraltar
Constitution reads as follows:
Whereas Gibraltar is part of Her Majesty's dominions and Her Majesty's
Government have given assurances to the people of Gibraltar that
Gibraltar will remain part of Her Majesty's dominions unless and until an
Act of Parliament otherwise provides, and furthermore that Her Majesty's
Government will never enter into arrangements under which the people of
Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of another state against their
freely and democratically expressed wishes ....
Id.
32. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. DOC. A/4684
(Dec. 14, 1960).
33. According to the official website of the Gibraltar government, 12,138 voters
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General Assembly, as noted in Resolution 2353, because the
referendum negated previous resolutions that called for the
British and Spanish governments to end Gibraltar's colonial
status through dialogue, while "safeguarding the interests of the
population."34 In this case, the General Assembly preferred that
the matter be decided through negotiations between the parties
and not through popular vote.35
During the 1980s, after Spain's transformation into a
democracy and improvement of its relations with the U.K., the
idea of ending British rule in Gibraltar arose anew. The issue
was officially discussed in meetings between representatives of
the two states.36 On July 12, 2002, Britain's Foreign Secretary
Jack Straw notified Parliament of a pending agreement
regarding shared control of the peninsula. 7  In response,
Gibraltar's local authorities announced the holding of an
additional referendum-an idea that was now totally rejected by
Her Majesty's government. 8  Despite this opposition, the
referendum was held in November 2002; 98.97% of the
participants rejected the proposed shared sovereignty plan.39
Although the British government reiterated that this was a
"local initiative,"4 it is widely conceded that the referendum's
results delayed negotiations between Britain and Spain.
Negotiations were renewed only two years later, with
Gibraltar's elected government as an independent party.
Britain's representatives were, moreover, forced to repeatedly
stress that when a comprehensive agreement on Gibraltar's
status was concluded, it would be brought before the
inhabitants for ratification by referendum, as required by the
voted to retain the link with Britain, while forty-four preferred Spanish sovereignty.
Official Government of Gibraltar London Website, Political Development,
http://www.gibraltar.gov.uldint/political.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
34. Question of Gibraltar, G.A. Res. 2353, U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. No.
16, U.N. DOC. A/7013 (Dec. 19, 1967).
35. Id.
36. These meetings are known as the "Brussels process."
37. The Straw Statement on Joint Sovereignty, U.K.-Spain, July 12, 2002
[hereinafter Westminister Declaration], available at http://www.liberal.gi/straw.asp.
38. See HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, GIBRALTAR, 2001-
02, H.C. 973, art. 24, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/
pa/cm200lO2/cmselect/cmfaff/9731973.pdf.
39. Press Release, Special Committee on Decolonization, Decolonization
Committee Considers Situations of Gibraltar, Cayman Islands, U.N. DOC.
GA/COL/3084 (June 4, 2003).
40. Norman Ho, A Rocky Road: The Political Fate of Gibraltar, HARv. INT'L
REV. (Winter 2004), http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1177/.
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Gibraltar Constitution Order of 1969.41
Today it is quite obvious that the fate of Gibraltar's
sovereignty will be determined as announced in 2004, in a
referendum meant to approve a draft agreement concluded
between the parties. Two sources rest at the heart of this
commitment: first, the Gibraltar Constitution, which includes,
as stated, a commitment to this effect made by Her Majesty's
government; and second, the British government's political
commitments, which involve the need to respond to the
aggressive public campaign waged by Gibraltar's government
and its inhabitants. The British government's stance
demonstrates the political benefits offered by the referendum,
although at no stage was it argued that international law
demands such an action.
Another example is the referendum held in Quebec during
the province's attempt to secede from Canada. The referendum
became the main issue in the historic decision handed down by
the Supreme Court of Canada in 1998.42 The decision was
delivered in reply to a request for an advisory opinion made by
the Federal Government of Canada. The request was delivered
following two referendums held at the initiation of Quebec's
government for the purpose of declaring its secession from the
Canadian confederation. A contributing factor was the
commitment made by Quebec's political leaders, who supported
the secession, to conduct a third referendum, after the second
one was decided by a margin of only one percent of the votes. In
these circumstances, the decision was made by the Federal
Government of Canada to turn to the courts for an advisory
opinion regarding Quebec's right, under Canadian constitutional
law or to international law, to unilaterally declare its secession
from the confederation. The court responded in the negative on
both accounts. It determined that a referendum, even if decided
by an overriding majority, does not enjoy the same legal status
as the constitution; therefore, a referendum does not have the
power to override the authority enjoyed by federal institutions, a
power anchored in the Constitution of Canada:
Quebec could not, despite a clear referendum result, purport to invoke
41. See RESPONSE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, 2003, cm. 5714, available at http://www.fco.
gov.uk/Files/kfile/Cm%205714,0.pdf (response of the British Foreign Office to the
disappointing report, HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note
38).
42. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [19981 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
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a right of self-determination to dictate the terms of a proposed
secession to the other parties to the federation. The democratic vote, by
however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and
could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law,
the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy
in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole.4 3
Yet the Canadian court did declare that the federal
government could not ignore the legitimacy of the demand that
the constitution should be revised in order to allow for the
secession, so long as the demand was supported by a clear public
majority. 4 The referendum was, therefore, considered to be the
medium through which the population could express its
preferences. The court also declared that should such a
situation-i.e., a pro-secession vote-arise, the federal
government, together with the provincial governments, would
be obligated to negotiate with the Quebec government on the
issue of revising the constitution as to allow the action.45
Crucially, the court unequivocally stated that the duty to engage
in negotiations in the wake of a referendum's results did not
imply that the government was required to comply with its
outcome. The Court recognized that such negotiations may fail,
with no agreement reached regarding Quebec's secession.4 6 Yet
the court refrained from speculating about the legal implications
of failed negotiations.4 7
By means of its decision, the Supreme Court of Canada had
in effect introduced a new constitutionally-bound duty,
previously unrecognized, which has since come to be referred to
as "the constitutional duty to negotiate. '4' This duty is based on
the democratic principle that government cannot remain
indifferent to clear public preferences. The court's
43. Id. at 221.
44. Id. at 265.
45. The Court declared, inter alia, that
[t]he federalism principle, in conjunction with the democratic principle,
dictates that the clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and
the clear expression of the desire to pursue secession by the population of a
province would give rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties to
Confederation to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that desire.
Id. at 265. The court also declared that "the continued existence and operation of
the Canadian constitutional order could not be indifferent to a clear expression of a
clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada." Id. at
221.
46. Id. at 269.
47. Id. at 270.
48. See, e.g., Dan Usher, The New Constitutional Duty to Negotiate, 20 POL'Y
OPTIONS 41 (Jan./Feb. 1999), available at http://irpp.org/po/archive/jan99/usher.pdf.
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pronouncement of this duty, however, was severely criticized by
Canadian jurists. 9
The Canadian court based its decisions (the first, rejection
of the legal status of the referendum; the second, the duty to
negotiate on the basis of the referendum's outcomes) solely on
an analysis of the Canadian Constitution. The decision
contained no reference to the referendum's status in
international law.
Another interesting feature of the decision pertained to the
issue of Quebec's indigenous minorities. These tribal
communities had argued before the court that Quebec's
independence could not be recognized-even with Canadian
federal government agreement-without their consent." Their
announcement introduced a new factor into the case. The
original case related to the potential agreement reached
between two states (Canada and the new state of Quebec) over
the transfer of territory to Quebec's sovereignty. The tribes
argued that Canada had a duty to obtain the consent of
segments of the population living in the region's north:
indigenous peoples whose lands had been annexed to Quebec at
the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
century. The court refused to hear this contention, and even
though it prepared an outline of the fundamental conditions to
be fulfilled for Quebec's secession to occur, it contented itself
with stating that the issue of indigenous peoples should be
raised during the negotiations."
Significant differences mark the Canadian from the Israeli-
Palestinian case. In the Canadian case, one group was intent on
undermining the state's sovereignty by means of a referendum
that would override the recognized right of territorial integrity.
In the Israeli-Palestinian case, the situation is diametrically
different: should an agreement be reached with respect to the
exchange of territory, the State of Israel will be exercising its
sovereignty for the purpose of border adjustments. Hence, the
relevant question becomes whether, for the purpose of
introducing such revisions, the state is duty-bound to conduct a
49. For scholarly criticism of this duty, see id.
50. Andrew Orkin & Joanna Birenbaum, The Aboriginal Argument: The
Requirement of Aboriginal Consent, in THE QUEBEC DECISION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
SUPREME COURT RULING ON SECESSION 83-84 (David Schneiderman ed., 1999). For
a different view of the implication of this decision for indigenous peoples, see Paul
Joffe, Quebec Secession and Aboriginal Peoples: Important Signals from the Supreme
Court, in THE QUEBEC DECISION, supra, at 137.
51. Orkin & Birenbaum, supra note 50, at 84.
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referendum among the area's residents. An additional
important distinction refers to the legal status of Quebec-a
province exhibiting a distinctive culture and language-as one
of thirteen provinces comprising the Canadian confederation. 2
Supporters of Quebec's secession argue that they are a "separate
people." In the Israeli-Palestinian case, the area's residents
belong to a people that do not enjoy-at least at present-any
autonomous legal status.
The final example to be discussed here is the referendum
that played a key role in the enactment of the Good Friday
Agreement. This agreement was meant to put an end to the
bloody, decades-old conflict regarding British rule over Northern
Ireland. 3 The agreement itself included an article obligating its
ratification in two simultaneous referendums-to be held in
Northern Ireland as well as in the Republic of Ireland
(necessary because the agreement's implementation required
revision of the Constitution of Ireland). In the referendums held
in May 1998, the agreement was resoundingly approved. 4
Three issues were at the focus of the agreement: creation of
new democratic institutions for Northern Ireland; construction
of a framework to strengthen Northern Ireland's ties with the
Republic of Ireland; and state succession in Northern Ireland,
involving the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to the
Republic of Ireland should the majority of Northern Ireland's
population approve this action in a public referendum.5 The
agreement delegated the authority to announce such a
referendum to the British government. More specifically,
referendums could be held once every seven years if the British
Foreign Secretary was convinced that the majority of voters
preferred separation from Britain accompanied by the transfer
of sovereignty to the Republic of Ireland. 6 To date, such a
referendum has not been held, with the source of the "delay"
being the agreement's implicit, mutually agreed-upon
52. Quebec is the sole Canadian province in which French rather than English
is the only official language.
53. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, U.K.-N. Ir., Apr. 10,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 751 [hereinafter Good Friday Agreement], available at
http://www.nio.gov.uklthe-agreement. The agreement is also known as the Belfast
Agreement, or, more rarely, the Stormont Agreement.
54. For a summary of results for both referendums, see University of Ulster
CAIN Web Service, Results of the Referenda in Northern Ireland and Republic of
Ireland, Friday 22 May 1998, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/ref1998.
htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
55. Id. annex A, para. 1(2).
56. Id. sched. 1.
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assumption that the public wishes to remain under British
rule. 7
Like the case of Gibraltar, the case of Northern Island rests
on a previous commitment made by Her Majesty's Government
not to alter the area's status without first obtaining the
population's approval. The specific stipulation appears in
Article 2 of the 1949 Ireland Act,58 which states that any
revision in Northern Ireland's status would be carried out only
after approval by Northern Ireland's Parliament. In 1973,
Britain initiated the first referendum held in the area to garner
support for its continued rule.59 The referendum lost its force,
however, when nationalists supporting unification with the
Republic of Ireland boycotted it.6" In Northern Ireland, like
Gibraltar, the British government repeatedly stressed its
commitment to accepting the popular will regarding the
sovereignty issue in order to dissipate tension among supporters
of unification with Britain whenever rumors about an
impending agreement began to circulate.6'
Northern Ireland is therefore a special case of the use of
referendums because the respective dispute is rooted in a bloody
conflict maintained between two factions whose members live in
the affected area. It is our analysis that the application of this
instrument was possible for two basic reasons: first, the
referendum was viewed as the sole mechanism available for
peacefully ending the conflict; second, its choice sprang from
British government commitments and its political interests,
coupled with the constitutional constraints effective in Northern
Ireland at the time.
What is important to our discussion is that, with respect to
all the states (Canada, Britain, and Ireland) and territories
(Quebec, Gibraltar, and Northern Ireland) involved, the
referendum was recognized as an instrument of internal,
constitutional law, and not as a result of a perceived
international law obligation.62  The referendum's
57. Id. at Constitutional Issues, para. 1(iii).
58. The Ireland Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 c. 41, available at
http://www.uniset.ca/naty/IrelandAct1949.pdf.
59. See MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY IN NORTHERN
IRELAND, 1969-2000, at 13 (2001).
60. See id. at 13-14.
61. Seeid. at 96.
62. It should also be noted that these examples were chosen for sake of the
discussion on referendums. Many other cases of state succession exist, some
discussed in this paper, where no referendum took place, and therefore they cannot
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appropriateness in the Israeli constitutional framework goes
beyond the limits of the present article.63
In summarizing this section, we find it impossible to point
to any duty or requirement to hold a referendum within the
framework of any international covenants or legal decisions
touching upon state succession.64 Our historical review has
indicated that referendums have generally been employed as
responses to political constraints or stipulations found in local
law. These cases, when added to the others mentioned that did
not involve referendums, such as the transfer of the Bakassi
Peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon and the transfer of
sovereignty in Hong Kong from Britain to China, demonstrate
that it is impossible to argue for the existence of customary
international law regarding this issue.
We should mention here another important point regarding
the relationship between a referendum and state succession: if,
as argued by those objecting to state succession, we should find
that this action inflicts a prohibited injury to the human rights
to be enjoyed by an area's inhabitants, then conduct of a
referendum cannot repair that injury, at least as far as those
who voiced their objection to the transfer by means of the
referendum are concerned. A majority cannot impose a
prohibited injury to a minority's rights, even by means of a
referendum. The acute question is therefore whether transfer of
a populated territory entails prohibited injury to human rights,
and not whether the succession is approved by proper means.
The recent past has, as discussed previously, provided
instances of referendums slated for state succession cases as
well as state succession treaties, concluded between
independent states, free of any mention of referendums. The
feature shared throughout is international law's deference to
state sovereignty in everything connected with border
determination, including the reliance on local law when
ratifying border adjustments.65 International law entrusts the
be seen as suggesting state practice.
63. For a detailed, up-to-date discussion of the subject see Elizabeth Garrett,
International Human Rights Law in Practice: Issues in Implementing Referendums
in Israel: A Comparative Study in Direct Democracy, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 159 (2001).
64. For a concurring opinion, see AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, HA-
MISHPAT HA-H. UKATI SHEL MEDINAT YISRA'EL [THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL] 914-915 (6th ed. 2005) (Hebrew).
65. As will be shown, this attitude differs from the attitude governing
discussions regarding the fate of the people living in the affected territories. See
infra Parts III, V, VI.
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determination of borders to the states themselves by employing
the mechanism of treaties. Similarly, international law offers
no restrictions to state succession if peacefully concluded
between the states, even when the respective territories are
populated. Stated simply, no legal duty has yet been defined
requiring the conduct of a referendum. This, of course, does not
mean that a referendum cannot be held on other foundations,
such as internal legal requirements.
The argument can also be posed such that a referendum is
morally compelled on civic grounds: referendums in general, but
especially on territorial issues, are increasingly being held.
Nonetheless, the position taken here is from a purely legal
perspective; it is impossible to rest such a requirement on
international law. The discussion on the justification of such a
step is thus reserved for the political-civic arena. It should be
clear, however, that additional conditions to a state succession
agreement must be examined, especially given growing
recognition of the priority of human rights on the international
law agenda. This we do below. We first examine the fate of the
inhabitants of the territories undergoing state succession from
the perspective of a human rights regime.
III. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP AND THE
STATE'S DUTY TO PREVENT STATELESSNESS
Transfers of sovereignty between independent states have
exposed a long list of problems in international law. Due to the
complexity of the issues, two conventions regulate such events.
6
The respective stipulations cover, for instance, everything
touching upon the successor state's responsibility to abide by all
the terms of any agreements signed by the predecessor state,67
and the successor state's rights and duties regarding property,
66. Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra note 12;
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts,
supra note 13.
67. Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra note 12.
We should note that very few countries have joined the convention. The crux of this
convention is not considered part of customary international law. See George Miron,
Memorandum of Law: Did the ABM Treaty of 1972 Remain in Force After the USSR
Ceased to Exist in December 1991 and Did It Become a Treaty Between the United
States and the Russian Federation?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 189, 255 (2002); Rein
Mullerson, New Developments in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 33 VA. J. INT'L
L. 299, 300 (1993).
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archives, and the financial debts of the predecessor state.6" Of
these, the most sensitive human rights issue for individuals
residing in the territory subject to transfer is citizenship. The
fact that no solution for this issue has yet been formulated in
one convention indicates its complexity, contentiousness, and
international law's caution regarding intervention in local laws
on this matter.
The idea of citizenship as a legal relationship between a
person and the state to which he belongs evolved during the
nineteenth century, together with the idea of the nation-state as
a political framework that grants rights and exacts duties.69 A
further significant development of the concept occurred in the
twentieth century, when "citizenship" was recognized as a
human right as well. Citizenship in its expanded meaning first
appeared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;7  its
Article 15 states that "[e]veryone has the right to a nationality"
and that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality."7 '
It is commonly accepted that questions of citizenship lie
primarily within the state's purview, to be treated within by
internal law. Nonetheless, local state arrangements with
respect to all aspects of citizenship must comply with the
conditions imposed by international law's various conventions.7 2
One of these conditions refers to the deprivation of citizenship
(i.e., statelessness). As recognition of the right to citizenship
spread, with citizenship acknowledged as a "right to enjoy
rights," international law increasingly demanded that situations
of statelessness be prevented. This demand obtained legal force
in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
68. Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra note 12.
69. For a general discussion of nationality, see YAFFA ZILBERSHATS, THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP (2002).
70. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
71. The determination of "nationality rights" raises significant difficulties
because it is commonly accepted that the existence of a right imposes the duty to
fulfill that right on some entity. In this case, it is difficult to identify the specific
entity on which to impose the duty to implement a stateless person's right to
nationality. See Jos6 Francisco Rezek, Le Droit International de la Nationalite, in
198(111) COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 333,
354 (1986).
72. See European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 3; Venice
Declaration, supra note 13, art. I, para. 2; see also G.A. Res. 55/153, annex, para. 2 of
preamble, U.N. DOC A/RES/55/153 (Jan. 30, 2001) ("[N]ationality is essentially
governed by internal law within the limits set by international law[.]"); Johannes M.
M. Chan, The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1991).
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signed by Israel that same year.73 Article 10 of the convention
contains the first reference to the implications of state
succession on citizenship having legal force in international
law.74 This article states that every agreement pertaining to
state succession of territories lying between states that are
signatories of the convention is required to include
arrangements guaranteeing that no person will be denied
citizenship as a result of the succession. Further, any state
having signed the convention as well as a state succession
agreement with a state not belonging to the convention is duty-
bound to do its utmost to introduce such arrangements into the
said agreement.75
After review of several documents and decisions, it appears
that from the perspective of international law, the main injury
to human rights likely to arise in cases of state succession is the
imposition of statelessness on the territory's inhabitants. For
example, one finds the following statement in the explanatory
report for the European Convention on Nationality: "The main
concern, although not the only one, is the avoidance of
statelessness .... This chapter aims to reinforce existing treaty
provisions on the avoidance of statelessness, such as Article 10
of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness."76
Based on the above, as well as the wording of the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness signed by Israel,
it is clear that in any case of state succession to which Israel
may be a party, it will be obligated to take the steps necessary
73. United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30,
1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175. Israel signed this convention but never ratified it.
74. The text of Article 10 is as follows:
1. Every treaty between Contracting States providing for the transfer of
territory shall include provisions designed to secure that no person shall
become stateless as a result of the transfer. A Contracting State shall use
its best endeavours to secure that any such treaty made by it with a State
which is not a party to this Convention includes such provisions.
2. In the absence of such provisions a Contracting State to which territory
is transferred or which otherwise acquires such territory shall confer its
nationality on such persons as would otherwise become stateless as a result
of the transfer or acquisition.
Id. art. 10.
75. Id. art. 10 ("A Contracting State shall use its best endeavours to secure that
any such treaty made by it with a State which is not a Party to this Convention
includes such provisions.").
76. European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, explanatory report
para. 107; see also G.A. Res. 55/153, annex art. 4, U.N. DOC A/RES/55/153 (Jan. 30,
2001) (prevention of statelessness).
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to ensure that the treaty signed prevents situations in which
Israeli citizens will become stateless as a result of the
succession. It is therefore quite clear that any proposal
regarding the transfer of populated territories goes contrary to
international law if it contains features that induce
statelessness.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF STATE SUCCESSION FOR THE
CITIZENSHIP OF A TERRITORY'S INHABITANTS: THE
"DEFAULT" CONDITION
A common assumption made in international law is that the
immediate consequence of state succession is the attribution of
the succeeding state's citizenship to the territory's inhabitants.
The European Commission for Democracy Through Law, an
advisory arm of the Council of Europe, gave greater credence to
this assumption when it issued the "Declaration on the
Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of Natural
Persons" in 1996. The high place this issue attained on the
commission's agenda was prompted by the desire to provide
legal assistance to new states that emerged in Central and
Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Article 8(a) of
the declaration77 repeats this assumption, which is based on the
"the presumption under international law that the population
follows the change of sovereignty over the territory in matters of
nationality.""
This presumption apparently entails two features:
attribution of the successor state's citizenship, and withdrawal
of the original, predecessor state's citizenship. Some view
withdrawal of citizenship as the predecessor state's obligation,
derived from its duty to recognize the successor state's
sovereignty over the transferred territory. In its notes, the
Venice Declaration states that "[a]n obligation by the
predecessor State to withdraw its nationality from inhabitants
of the transferred territory may be seen as a corollary of the
obligation to recognise the validity of the transfer[.]" 9
77. Known as the "Venice Declaration," after the city in which the commission
is located.
78. European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, para. 108 of the notes;
see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 628 (6th ed.
2003).
79. European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Consequences of State
Succession for Nationality: Draft Report art. 111(2), para. 84 (Aug. 30, 1996)
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We should recall that the Venice Commission was an
advisory body, meaning that its proposals carry no force of law.
Nonetheless, all the states belonging to the Council of Europe,
as represented by their senior jurists, participate as its
members, and its opinions are commonly held by legal
scholars. ° Further, even when disputes arise over whether the
accumulated experience has reached the point of being
considered as customary international law,"' there is little doubt
that an automatic change in citizenship represents the default
solution in the overwhelming majority of state succession cases.
This assumption has also been anchored in agreements defining
what are considered deviations from the default.
In 1999, the U.N. International Law Commission adopted
draft articles on nationality of natural persons in relation to the
succession of States. The following year, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that in situations
of state succession, states act according to the Draft Articles.82
This document also assumes that the transfer of sovereignty
automatically entails the transfer of citizenship. Article 5 of the
proposed convention, addressing "Presumption of Nationality,"
obligates only the automatic attribution of the succeeding state's
citizenship (it makes no reference to the withdrawal of the
preceding state's citizenship). Article 20, however, which deals
with the transfer of segments of a state's territory, is entitled:
"Attribution of the nationality of the successor State and
withdrawal of the nationality of the predecessor State," that is,
withdrawal of the citizenship associated with state A and
attribution of the citizenship associated with state B. Yet, as
opposed to earlier documents, the proposed article stresses the
[hereinafter Venice Declaration Draft Report], available at http://www.venice.coe.int/
docs/1996/CDL-NAT(1996)005rev3-e.asp.
80. See, e.g., PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 147-52 (2d ed. 1979) ("[I]n the absence of an obligation specifically undertaken
by treaty, the predecessor State is bound by international law to withdraw its
nationality from the inhabitants of the transferred territory").
81. For the position stating that no such automatic rule having the force of law
exists, see id. at 143; Yasuaki Onuma, Nationality and Territorial Change: In Search
of the State of the Law, 8 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1981-1982); A. Randelzhofer,
Nationality, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 501, 505 (Rudolf
Bernhardt ed., 1997). For a similar stance taken by the Constitutional Court of
Germany, see Kay Hailbronner, Legal Aspects of the Unification of the Two German
States, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 18 (1991). Alternatively, for a review of the position in
favor of recognizing this rule of automatic transfer of citizenship, see BROWNLIE,
supra note 78, at 628; D.P. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 246 (Press
1956); Chan, supra note 72, at 11; Onuma, supra, at 1.
82. See G.A. Res. 55/153, U.N. DOC A/RES/55/153 (Jan. 30, 2001).
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possibility of deviating from this principal, an issue we turn to
later.
We can conclude from the above that based on the practice
of contemporary international practice, unless otherwise agreed
upon by parties to a treaty, situations of state succession
generally lead to the attribution of citizenship by the successor
state to the inhabitants of the territory, and the withdrawal of
citizenship by the predecessor state. This outcome, however, is
only a default solution; it is possible-and sometimes
necessary-to digress from this practice, as we demonstrate
next.
V. RIGHT OF OPTION AND THE RIGHT TO RETAIN THE
CITIZENSHIP OF THE PREDECESSOR STATE
A. FROM AN "OLD" RIGHT OF OPTION TO A "NEW" RIGHT OF
OPTION
In the clear majority of agreements and conventions
pertaining to state succession in populated areas, instructions
were included regarding the granting of the right of option to
the transferred territory's population. This right gives people
the opportunity of opting for either acquisition of the citizenship
of the successor state or retention of the citizenship of the
predecessor state (often at the cost of migrating from the
territory). Despite its frequent use, the concept "right of option"
is imprecise; it has therefore acquired numerous meanings in
international law. The concept expresses different ideas
regarding its scope, the conditions under which it can be
enjoyed, the persons who can enjoy it, and the states obligated
to grant it (as well as the conditions that generate such an
obligation). Regarding international practice, the right of option
has been granted in the vast majority of cases of state
succession although there have been exceptions.83 Yet, in all
83. Hence, for example, the right of option was not granted in one of history's
major cases of state succession: the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine to France following
World War I. See Onuma, supra note 81, at 8. This region, which had been
transferred to German sovereignty in 1871, was populated by more than 1.5 million
people. The Treaty of Versailles states that Alsace is to be transferred to French
sovereignty. See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 28, art. 51. The agreement
determined that every French national who lived in the territory prior to its 1871
transfer to Germany, as well as every person born in the region whose nationality
was unknown or undetermined, would automatically acquire French nationality. See
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these cases, the very granting of this right and its provisions
was subject to the consent of the states involved. Similarly,
despite the customary practice to grant a right of option,
international tribunals have so far avoided intervening in
bipartite agreements over its granting and content.84
This version of the right of option-what may be considered
the basis of future developments-also called the "old" right of
option in the literature,85  was regularly mentioned in
agreements concluded from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth
century. The right was meant to give a transferred territory's
residents the option of rejecting the successor state's citizenship,
expressed through physical exit from the said territory.
Although the right was not anchored in international law at the
time, the custom that evolved in the majority of agreements was
to allow it. As O'Connell writes in his 1956 book:
It cannot be said with any authority that international law imposes a
duty upon the successor State to permit the inhabitants of absorbed
territory to repudiate its nationality by removing themselves to a
foreign country, or by opting for an alternative nationality. It has been
customary, however, since at least 1785, to permit such option[.]86
Articles referring to the right of option were especially
common in the agreements signed after the two world wars. For
instance, the Treaty of Versailles 7 and the Treaty of Trianon,88
both signed at the end of World War I, included a considerable
number of state successions including, among others, those from
Germany to Denmark, Poland, Italy, and Belgium, as well as
from Hungary to Czechoslovakia and Serbia. In each of these
cases, articles were introduced that granted the right of option
to residents interested in retaining their previous citizenship
id. annex to art. 79. Germany, for its part, pledged never to claim, at any time or
place, that the residents of Alsace-Lorraine (whose Germany nationality was now
withdrawn) were German citizens. See id. art. 52. These persons, comprising the
majority of Alsace's population, were never permitted to exercise any right of option;
attribution of French nationality and withdrawal of German nationality were
automatically executed. German nationals were the only persons given the right to
leave the territory. Although Germany pledged to absorb these persons, the new
German citizens of French origin were never given the same right.
84. WEIS, supra note 80, at 157.
85. Id. at 156.
86. O'CONNELL, supra note 81, at 259 (citations omitted).
87. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 28.
88. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary,
June 4, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter Trianon Treaty], available at
http://www.lib.byu.edu/-rdh/wwi/versa/tril.htm. The treaty determined modern
Hungary's borders after the Austro-Hungarian defeat in World War I.
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under the condition that they physically depart from the area
within a fixed period of time. For example, Article 113 of the
Treaty of Versailles, which deals with the transfer of Schleswig
from Germany to Denmark, stipulates that: "[p]ersons who have
exercised the above right to opt must within the ensuing twelve
months transfer their place of residence to the State in favour of
which they have opted." In the peace treaty signed between
France and Italy in 1947,89 which included the transfer of
territory from Italy to France, a paragraph was introduced that
grants the right to retain Italian citizenship so long as persons
electing to do so leave the region.0 Again, the 1954 treaty
transferring the region of Trieste from Italy to Yugoslavia
included an identical arrangement.9
It is doubtful, however, that the demand to leave one's home
as a consequence of state succession, and the wish to retain
one's original citizenship, complies with currently accepted
international standards regarding the protection of human
rights.9 2 In light of the great importance attached to a person's
ties with his home and physical environment, we can establish a
person's clear interest in not being uprooted from his home.93 It
is for this reason that international law expressly and
persistently prohibits population transfers94 but does not take
the same position regarding changes of citizenship-as stated, it
only prohibits the creation of conditions conducive to
statelessness or the withdrawal of citizenship.
In the modern context, it appears more appropriate to speak
of the right of option as a right attached to the resident of an
area undergoing state succession to retain his previous
citizenship while continuing to live in that area. Nonetheless,
the European Convention on Nationality (1997) continued the
policy of avoiding any explicit discussion of the right of option.
89. Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, 49 U.N.T.S. 3.
90. See Venice Declaration Draft Report, supra note 79, art. 11(3), para. 55; see
also id. art II (a comprehensive list of cases of state succession concluded in Europe).
91. Id. art. 111(3), para. 91.
92. Id. art. 89.
93. For a discussion of a person's right not to be uprooted from his place of
residence, see Patrick McFadden, The Right to Stay, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1,
23-24 (1996).
94. For a comprehensive survey of the issue of population transfers in
international law, see the report of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights: A.S. Al-
Khasawneh & R. Hatano, The Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer,
Including the Implantation of Settlers (1993, 2/1993/17 Sub/4. CN/E). See also A.S.
Al-Khasawneh, Freedom of Movement: Human Right and Population Transfer
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/23, 1997).
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The only reference to this right made in the convention, found in
paragraph 5 (State Succession and Nationality), notes that in
any decision regarding the attribution of a new citizenship or
the retention of a previous citizenship in territory undergoing
succession, each of the states involved is required to consider
four factors, one of which is the inhabitants' preferences. 5 The
convention therefore leaves the decision in the hands of the
parties to the agreement. In contrast, the Venice Declaration
includes a direct reference to the right of option. Article V
assigns to the successor state the duty to grant the inhabitants
the right to opt for the citizenship of the predecessor state: "In
all cases of State succession, when the predecessor State
continues to exist, the successor State(s) shall grant the right of
option in favour of the nationality of the predecessor State."96
The same convention openly declares that such a choice does not
reduce the obligation to leave the transferred territory. 7
Hence, the "new" right of option, which is compatible with
widely accepted and modern rules of international law, obligates
the predecessor as well as the successor state to grant the
persons affected a dual right of option: first, the right to opt to
transfer her place of residence to the sovereign territory of the
predecessor state or to accept, together with the territory, the
sovereignty of the successor state; second, in cases where the
citizenship of the successor state is accepted, the right to opt to
retain the citizenship of the predecessor state concurrently.
Although the granting of the "new" right of option has not been
duly institutionalized in contemporary law, a trend appears to
be developing to recognize this right, thanks to the Venice
Commission and other events to which we will refer shortly. We
can therefore assume that if the subject should arise in the
Israeli-Palestinian case, the granting of the "new" right of option
will be among the demands met by any arrangement between
the parties.
95. The resident's preferences are listed as the third factor. The other factors
are: a genuine and effective link of the person with the respective state, the person's
place of residence at the time of the succession, and the territorial origins of the
person involved.
96. Venice Declaration, supra note 13, art. V, para. 13(a).
97. Venice Declaration, supra note 13, art. V, para. 16. ("The exercise of the
right to choose the nationality of the predecessor State . . . shall have no prejudicial
consequences for those making that choice, in particular with regard to their right to
residence in the successor State[.]").
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B. WHO CAN EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF OPTION?
The right of option is not automatically granted to every
inhabitant of a transferred territory. The relevant article in the
Trianon Treaty (1920) states that a resident of the territory to
be transferred could opt only for the citizenship of the state in
which the majority of the population belonged to his own race
and spoke his own language.9" The Italian peace treaties signed
in 1947 made use of the language test as the sole criterion for
granting the right of option. It openly stated that a resident of
the area could opt for the citizenship of the state in which the
majority of the population spoke the person's language.99
The Venice Declaration, dated 1996, is, as stated, the first
legal document to explicitly mention the "new," modern right to
option. Article V of the Declaration asserts that the granting of
this right depends on the existence of an "effective link" between
the area's inhabitants and the respective state.'0 0 The article
details the possible features of an "effective link" as requiring
ethnic, linguistic, or religious ties. This implies that, just as in
the Venice Declaration, the right of option can be granted
exclusively to persons preferring the citizenship of the state
with which they have linguistic, ethnic, or religious affiliations.
This text illustrates the considerable weight given to national
ties and the desire to avoid severing people from their national
environment. Article 18 of the European Convention on
Nationality (1997) makes mention of a person's "genuine and
effective link" with the state whose citizenship he prefers as one
of the criteria to be considered when deciding whether to
attribute the successor state's citizenship or to allow the
inhabitants to retain that of the predecessor state.' The source
of the "genuine and effective link" test itself is found in the
decision handed down by the ICJ in the Nottebohm case, °2
98. Trianon Treaty, supra note 88, art. 64.
99. WEIS, supra note 80, at 158; Editorial Comment, The Progressive
Development of International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 627 (1947).
100. Venice Declaration, supra note 13, art. V, para. 14 ("The successor States
may make the exercise of the right of option conditional on the existence of effective
links, in particular ethnic, linguistic or religious, with the predecessor State[.]").
101. European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 18(2)(a).
102. Nottebohm (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6). In this
decision, it was declared that no state was authorized to pass citizenship laws as it
saw fit; a state cannot expect those laws to be validated by international law if they
do not capture the general intent of granting citizenship, based on the effective links
maintained between the state and the individual. According to the decision, the
concept of citizenship is a legal translation of the fact that individuals have strong
ties with the population in the respective state.
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which was incorporated, verbatim, into the European
Convention on Nationality. 3
At this point we should mention that some doubt exists as
to whether avoiding disconnecting a person from his national
affiliation-group can be employed as a relevant justification in
the Israel-Palestinian case. This case appears to be the reverse,
a case of anti-irredentism. The proposals raised within the
framework of the Israeli debate on the subject relate to the
transfer of territory currently held by Israel, in which a Jewish
national majority exists, but inhabited by an Arab-Palestinian
population, to a future Palestinian state, in which the national
majority will be Palestinian. The main arguments raised by the
transfer's opponents are not rooted in application of the national
affiliation-group criterion, but instead focus on problems
emanating from the injury to political, citizenship, and socio-
economic rights, in addition to the Arab population's severance
from Israel and its internal Arab social-communal
environment.' 4  Arguments reflecting this perspective can
readily be targeted at demonstrating the existence of a "genuine
and effective connection" between the Arab inhabitants of the
territory to be transferred and Israel, due to residential and
cultural connections maintained with Israel's Arab-Palestinian
minority.
Without plunging into a detailed analysis of this complex
issue, we should state that even if we accept this argument, the
relevant international documents' 5  view this "effective
connection" as only one of several to be considered when
deciding to grant the right of option; it does not, therefore,
present a barrier to any state succession agreement. Further,
there is little doubt that even if some previous successions
103. European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, explanatory report art.
113.
104. In a survey conducted by Mada al-Carmel Arab Center for Applied Social
Research, 91% of the respondents (Arab Israeli residents of the "Triangle" region in
Israel) objected to the territorial exchange program "announced by the Israeli
government." For our purposes, it is interesting to note the reasons for their
objection. According to the Center's website, of those opposing the plan, 43% feared
that they would be forced to leave their homeland; 33% believed that residence in
the Palestinian Authority would lower their standard of living; 22% feared they
would lose their place of employment; 17% did not want to lose their rights as Israeli
citizens; 12% were concerned by the Palestinian Authority's tentative future; and
11% cited separation from friends and family. A description of the survey can be
found at http://www.mada-research.org/sru/press-release/survey-landPop.shtml.
105. See, e.g., Venice Declaration, supra note 13, art. V, para. 14; European
Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 18.
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affected the economic conditions of the transferred territory's
population to a lesser degree than that anticipated in the
Israeli-Palestinian case, economic welfare was never at the
focus of discussions on the succession's implications for
nationality.
One exception to this rule is the ICJ's decision regarding
the border between Cameroon and Nigeria.' °6 In this case, the
inhabitants argued that the transfer would reduce the social
services that they received from the government. The court was
unmoved by the argument, and contented itself to calling for
cooperation between the states in order to maintain the previous
level of service delivery. It also noted the commitment to
cooperate expressed by Cameroon's representative:
(T]he implementation of the present Judgment will afford the
Parties a beneficial opportunity to co-operate in the interests of the
population concerned, in order notably to enable it to continue to have
access to educational and health services comparable to those it
currently enjoys .... The Court takes note with satisfaction of the
commitment thus undertaken in respect of these areas where many
Nigerian nationals reside.1
0 7
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if a practical discussion
is ever held on the various proposals regarding the transfer of
populated territory between Israel and the future Palestinian
state, similar appeals will be heard. We would even argue that
a positive response to such a request is mandatory given the
State of Israel's responsibility for its citizens.
The 1999 Draft Articles of the International Law
Commission Convention, which address the same subject, go one
step further and include an article that attends to the "respect
for the will of persons concerned" in everything associated with
the right of option: "Each State concerned shall grant a right to
opt for its nationality to persons concerned who have
appropriate connection with that State if those persons would
otherwise become stateless as a result of the succession of
States."'' 8  The article therefore limits the duty to grant the
right of option to those cases of succession where people may
find themselves in a situation of statelessness. The concept of
"appropriate connection," as it appears in this statement, is
meant to cover a wider range of conditions than those previously
106. See Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nig.: Eq. Guinea Intervening) 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10).
107. Id. arts. 316-17.
108. G.A. Res. 55/153, annex art. 11, U.N. DOcA/RES/55/153 (Jan. 30, 2001).
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referred to by the phrase "genuine and effective connection."109
The U.N. International Law Commission's choice of wording
resulted from the desire to avoid instances of statelessness, even
if doing so implied expanding eligibility for the right of option." °
The commission would later propose an even more far-reaching
stipulation. In the article dedicated to cases of state succession
in which only a part of a state's territory is transferred, the
commission asserted that the successor state was to extend its
citizenship to the area's inhabitants, whereas the predecessor
state was to withdraw its citizenship from those same persons,
excluding cases to be decided through the exercise of the right of
option by the inhabitants."' This wording implies that the right
to opt would be granted to all the affected area's inhabitants.
This proposal, which extends eligibility for the right of option to
an entire territory's inhabitants, represents an attempt to
modify customary international law; it does not reflect current
international law. Indeed the International Law Commission
has stated in the article's explanatory notes that this is its
position, "even if this were to entail a progressive development
of international law."
'
"
12
The implications of the gap between the European approach
expressed in the Venice Declaration, and the U.N. Commission
approach just cited, erupted in all their force at the June 1997
meeting of the U.N. Commission, at which the Draft Articles
were slated for discussion."3  Constantine Economides, a
member of the U.N. Commission and the person responsible for
preparing the Venice Declaration, argued that the proposal
represented a significant deviation from customary practice. He
also argued that eligibility for the right of option is to be
narrowly defined; too broad a definition "not only goes against
custom, it also contains implicit dangers.""4  The rapporteur,
Vaclav Mikulka, agreed that some justice could be found in this
argument and even noted that other sources had criticized the
commission's "generosity" in this matter. Yet, after initial
hesitation, he argued that he believed that this position was
more appropriate for the close of the twentieth century,"5 and
109. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
110. G.A. Res. 55/153, annex art. 11, U.N. DocA/RES/55/153 (Jan. 30, 2001).
111. Id. art. 20.
112. Id. art 5, para. 20.
113. For the substance of the discussion, see Summary Records of the 2489th
Meeting, [1997] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 102, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ Ser.A/1997.
114. Id. at 103.
115. Id.
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that the European version of the "effective connection" can be
discriminatory."6  We should mention that in the end, the
original version of the U.N. Commission report was approved by
the U.N. General Assembly as an annex to the resolution, with
the recommendation that member states act accordingly." 7 In
2004, the General Assembly received comments from member
states regarding the document's wording, as well as the
appropriateness of introducing a mandatory instrument into
international law.' 8
The preceding review of the issues leads us to the
conclusion that when the transfer of territory between Israel
and the future Palestinian state reaches the discussion level,
the right of option with respect to retaining Israeli citizenship
will certainly arise. In the current state of international law, no
convention legally obligates the granting of the right of option in
its broader form to all the inhabitants of an area undergoing
succession. Judging from past experience, the granting of the
right to opt to retain Israeli citizenship will ultimately depend
on the agreement reached between the parties. Nonetheless, as
we have seen, two trends currently coexist, both of which
deserve consideration: first, the sincere intention (if we can
judge from the U.N. International Law Commission's proposal)
to anchor a state's duties to the population of a territory being
transferred in a binding convention, especially regarding its
scope; second, broadening the scope and availability of the right
of option to all of a transferred area's inhabitants. Even if we
were only speaking of trends open to disagreement, we must be
aware of them and pay them the necessary respect during any
debate. As we see it, from the perspective of the European as
well as the International Law Commission approach, it will be
expected that a right of option be extended to an area's entire
population in future instances of state succession.
C. RESTRICTIONS TO THE RIGHT OF OPTION: TIME AND DUAL
CITIZENSHIP
Even when the right of option is available to a succeeded
territory's inhabitants, it is usually subject to technical and
substantive restrictions. The most common technical restriction
116. Id. at 105.
117. See G.A. Res. 55/153, U.N. DOC A/RES/55/153 (Jan. 30, 2001). Notice that
the decision does not have the force of law.
118. G.A. Res. 59/43, U.N. DOC. A/RES/59/43 (Dec. 16, 2004).
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is time. This right is neither fixed nor permanently available
with the period of its enjoyment-usually ranging from a few
months to three yearsl'-set by the parties involved. The
implications of not exercising this right within a defined period
usually mean resorting to the default condition previously
noted: loss of the person's status as a citizen of the predecessor
state. 120
A more substantive restriction on the exercise of the right of
option is dual citizenship. Every state can decide its own legal
position regarding whether its nationals can hold the citizenship
of other states in addition to its own. In the past, the
international community attempted to reduce the phenomenon
of dual or multiple citizenship. 2 ' Although many states began
displaying an increasing willingness to recognize dual
citizenship after the fall of the Iron Curtain, many
democracies-including the Scandinavian countries, Germany,
and Estonia, to name a few-continue to refuse to permit such a
status. '22
Even if the duty to grant a transferred territory's
population the right to opt for citizenship of the predecessor as
opposed to the successor state, this duty does not in itself
compel recognition of dual citizenship. The notes to the Draft
Articles of the U.N. International Law Commission (1999) do
not encourage a universal policy of dual or multiple citizenships;
119. Past experience has shown that a wide range of time limits have been set in
decisions related to the right of option. We cite a few examples: in the treaty
reached by France and Algeria regarding the granting of independence to Algeria,
the respective time period was set at three years; in the agreement between Spain
and Morocco regarding transfer of the Sidi Ifni region to Morocco, the time period
was limited to three months; the Treaty of Versailles set a time limit of two years in
the majority of cases; the Italian peace treaties signed in 1947 defined the length of
that period as one year. See O'CONNELL, supra note 81, at 263 (providing additional
examples of time limitations on the right of option).
120. This led to the withdrawal of French citizenship from French citizens of
Algerian origin who had lived in Algeria during the French departure and who had
not exercised their right to declare their preference for French citizenship during the
three-year interim period allotted by French law. For a detailed discussion of the
case of a French resident of Algerian origin who lost his citizenship and then
claimed that he was informed of this loss only after France requested his extradition
as a result of a series of felonies he had committed, see Beldjoudi v. France, 234 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 6, 8-17 (1992). The court prohibited the extradition on the grounds of the
immeasurable injury to the plaintiffs family life and to his wife (a French citizen of
French origin), although it did not disagree with France's right to deport the
plaintiff in order to protect public order and prevent crime. Id. at 26-28.
121. See Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military
Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, May 6, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 43.
122. See Venice Declaration Draft Report, supra note 79, art. 111(6), para. 105.
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instead, they leave it to each state to independently decide
which position it will take.'23 Articles 9 and 10 of the convention
explicitly establish each state's right to condition the attribution
of citizenship on renunciation of the predecessor state's
citizenship, and the right of the predecessor state to withdraw
citizenship from those residents of the transferred territory who
accept the citizenship of the successor state.
We can conclude from this discussion that from the
perspective of international law, several events are likely to
transpire should the Israelis and the Palestinians arrive at a
comprehensive agreement regarding the transfer of populated
territory. If the populations of the areas to be transferred to the
future Palestinian state should choose to retain their Israeli
citizenship, it increasingly appears that their right to do so will
be recognized. Nonetheless, the option of dual citizenship-i.e.,
the holding of Israeli parallel with Palestinian citizenship-will
be subject to the approval of the parties and influenced by the
internal laws of the respective states. Enjoyment of this right
will be restricted to a set period of time, after which Palestinian
citizenship will automatically be attributed to the inhabitants at
the price of the loss of their Israeli citizenship. During the
period in which the right to opt is in effect-so long as Israeli
law, which currently permits dual citizenship is not revised' 2 4-
Arab Palestinian residents of the respective territories will be
allowed to hold dual Israeli-Palestinian citizenship. This
situation will also be subject to the laws of the future
Palestinian state, that is, whether Palestine will be amenable to
permitting its nationals to hold Israeli citizenship. In such a
case, a Palestinian choosing to retain his Israeli citizenship will
acquire the status of an Israeli citizen residing outside Israel's
borders, with all that implies: loss of the right to vote in Knesset
elections,'25 loss of the possibility of bequeathing citizenship
123. See G.A. Res. 55/153, annex art. 9, U.N. Doc A/RES/55/153 (Jan. 30, 2001).
124. Israeli citizens are not required to cancel their foreign citizenship as a
condition of receiving Israeli citizenship. Should Israel request withdrawal of Israeli
citizenship from those residents of the transferred territories who refuse to renounce
their Palestinian citizenship, Israel will be required to present a persuasive
justification for its differentiation between these persons and those allowed to
maintain some other foreign citizenship. In the absence of such a justification,
demands for rescinding the Arabs' Israeli citizenship will be treated as unwarranted
discrimination.
125. An Israeli citizen's basic right to vote is subject to him or her being
registered as a voter. The main condition for inclusion in the voting registry is an
individual's inclusion in the population registry. A person who does not reside in
Israel is not listed in the voting registry and is therefore ineligible to vote. Knesset
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beyond one generation,'2 6 and so forth.
VI. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
An additional issue lying within the sphere of international
law concerns self-determination: Does the right to self-
determination affect the prospects of state succession in
populated territories? One possible argument is that the very
fact of the transfer of populated territories undermines the right
to self-determination of the inhabitants (in this case, Israeli
citizens of Palestinian origin).'27
The right to self-determination is recognized by Article 1(1)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: "All
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.""'2 The
right to self-determination thus reflects the aspiration to ensure
that all people enjoy the opportunity to express their cultures
within the civil arena in addition to the readiness to promote
the interests of future generations.'29 Given that, international
law distinguishes between two separate dimensions of this
right. On the first, external dimension, the goals of self-
determination are attained by defining a group as an
autonomous political entity (primarily by establishing an
independent state in the geographic area in which the group
resides) where the group's members can make the major
decisions. On the second, internal or intra-state dimension,
national minorities are given the opportunity to enjoy selected
aspects of self-determination, such as the right to a unique
culture.3 ° The need to protect a minority's culture becomes
Elections Law (Consolidated Version), art. 28 (1969) (Isr.) (Hebrew).
126. RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 64, at 1103 (Hebrew).
127. The inhabitants' preferences can be ascertained by means of a referendum.
For the reasons stated, however, we believe that such a step is not required by
international law. See supra Part I.
128. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), art. 1(1), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (ratified by
the State of Israel in 1992); see also U.N. Charter arts. 1(2), 55; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by the State of Israel in 1992).
129. See RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 64, at 324 (Hebrew); HENRY J.
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1278 (2d ed.
2000).
130. For more on the issue of external and internal self-determination, see
ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 67-140
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particularly acute within the framework of the nation-state.
The more that a state openly and intensively encourages the
majority culture, and the more that the majority culture
dominates the civil arena, the greater the need to create
arrangements for preserving and reinforcing the minority
culture.' 3' These arrangements include: the granting of limited
rights to self-management, the freedom to publicly express the
group's culture (especially the group's distinctive language), and
government assistance in preserving group culture (particularly
in the sphere of education). These arrangements can be allowed
so long as they do not significantly deviate from the
fundamental principles of the state in question.'32
We think that the right to self-determination does not
impede conclusion of any agreement regarding the transfer of
populated territories. The practice of international law shows
that the right to self-determination was never treated as a
mechanism directed at allowing a minority group to veto any
such action. Obviously, the right to self-determination in its
external sense (the right to establish an independent state) is
not available to the Arab minority within the framework of the
State of Israel. Such a right can be granted only to national
groups subjugated to the rule of colonial regimes or national
minorities suffering at the hands of a dictatorial regime that
denies them any avenue for self-expression within the state's
boundaries.'33 If, however, a final peace agreement between
Israel and a future Palestinian state should be conditioned on
the transfer of populated territories, it will, as stated earlier, do
so only to promote a "two states solution" that is inherently
rooted in the right of self-determination. In this sense, the
(1995).
131. See Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to
Culture, 71 SOc. RES. 529, 530 (2004); Tibor Vrady, Minorities, Majorities, Law,
and Ethnicity: Reflections of the Yugoslav Case, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 9, 47 (1997).
132. See RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 64, at 332 (Hebrew); see also CHAIM
GANS, THE LIMITS OF NATIONALISM 67-70 (2003) (presenting an interesting
theoretical discussion on the right to self-determination).
133. See the following comment made by the Supreme Court of Canada:
[A] right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination
of people at international law where "a people" is governed as part of a
colonial empire; where "a people" is subject to alien subjugation,
domination or exploitation; and possibly where "a people" is denied any
meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of
which it forms a part. In other circumstances, peoples are expected to
achieve self-determination within the framework of their existing state.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 222 (Can.).
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exchange of populated territory within the framework of a
comprehensive peace agreement will effectively strengthen
rather than weaken the right to independent self-determination.
Moreover, agreement to the exchange of populated territory
does not-in theory-interfere with the exercise of the right to
self-determination on the internal, intra-state dimension. As
previously stated, the right of option allows persons living in an
area subject to succession to opt for their preferred national
identity and thereby exercise the right of self-determination. In
the Israeli-Palestinian case, one route for doing so is to opt to
remain in the transferred territory and join the future
Palestinian state which will be characterized by a Palestinian
national identity. The other direction for exercising self-
determination is to opt to remain in Israeli territory as part of
the Arab minority in Israel-a group that already enjoys the
right to preserve its national culture and language within
Israel's current political framework as a Jewish and democratic
state.
VII. THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
The final issue that may rise in the Israeli-Palestinian
context is the application of the principle of equality and the
prohibition against discrimination. The prohibition against
discrimination was spelled out in Article 1(a) of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination'3 4 as well as in other major conventions.'35
Article 1 defines "racial discrimination" as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise,
on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
With respect to our subject, the pertinent argument appears to
claim that territorial exchanges between Israel and the future
Palestinian state, if they include the transfer of areas populated
by Israeli citizens of Palestinian nationality, represent acts of
134. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106A (XX), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (Dec. 21, 1965) (signed by
Israel on Mar. 7, 1966).
135. See also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
supra note 128, art. 2(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 128, art. 2(1).
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prohibited discrimination resting on national identity.'3 6 This
argument assumes that the act of transfer itself hinders the
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms; if no
such injury occurs, there is no prohibited discrimination.'37
In our opinion, the granting of a dual right of option-i.e.,
the area's inhabitants can opt to continue residing within
Israel's boundaries as Israeli citizens as well as reside in the
future Palestinian state as Palestinian citizens so long as the
agreements signed by the parties guarantee the enjoyment of
these rights 3S--will avoid committing the said injury. The
frequency of exchanges of populated territory observed, as well
as the practice's anchoring in international covenants indicate
that international law does not consider transfers implemented
according to the rules-that is, they include the right of option-
as instances of prohibited discrimination. It may be argued that
a discriminatory motive for an act of state succession may
constitute prohibited discrimination. Nonetheless, we believe
that a peace treaty that delineates borders along ethnic lines is
legitimate, as it fulfills a legitimate end, which is often the basis
of such agreements.
EPILOGUE
Within the context of the public and academic debate on
proposals for initiating a state succession action in territories
lying within Israel's borders to the benefit of a future
Palestinian state, two polar approaches have been applied: the
first refers to the idea as legally feasible and desirable from
other points of view, as long as it is fulfilled through agreement
between the parties; the second refers to proposals as patently
illegal and verging on racism. As described, the legal reality-
at least according to international law-rests on much more
complex values.
Based on the analysis conducted, we can arrive at a number
of conclusions. First, states are entitled to decide their mutual
borders between themselves. There appear to be no judicial
136. ARIELI ET AL., supra note 7, at 68.
137. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, supra note 134 (prohibiting discriminatory acts).
138. This excludes those rights conditioned on residence in Israel, such as the
right to vote in Knesset elections, which is granted only to those persons who opt to
remain in Israel. See Knesset Elections Law (Consolidated Version), art. 28 (1969)
(Isr.) (Hebrew); supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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constraints, at least in international law, on transferring
populated territories from the sovereignty of one state to
another. Second, according to developing trends in
international law, such a move demands that all the persons
involved be granted a broad right of option in order to allow
them to retain their Israeli citizenship (in this case) even if they
opt to accept Palestinian sovereignty. Third, it is quite doubtful
that such a step, which was originally meant to maintain a
Jewish majority in the respective areas'39 (in addition to
ensuring the greatest recognition of the reality characterizing
both sides of the "green line"), can achieve its objective-given
the possibility that the Palestinian residents of these areas may
choose to relocate to within the new borders of Israel. Under
these conditions, the political and legal rug will be pulled from
under the initiative. Finally, some doubt has been raised
regarding the desirability of this step-even assuming that it
will accomplish its objectives-on the basis of other
considerations. The damage it may arguably cause to the
delicate network of relations constructed between Jews and
Arabs in Israel may exceed the benefits to be gained. Moreover,
we cannot be at all sure that the future Palestinian state will
agree to this move, implying that a firm consensus represents a
necessary condition for such a move to gain any validity within
the framework of international law. Therefore, in the absence of
broad agreement on the part of the affected persons-an
agreement that would provide an adequate response to this
issue-it would be inappropriate to promote such a solution as
far as its sole intent remains continuation of a Jewish majority
in the State of Israel.
139. National planning, which embodies the aspiration to sustain a Jewish
majority, is a legitimate and fitting goal in Israeli law. The real issues remain, as
always, the means selected to accomplish this aim. For more on this issue, see the
discussion in Amnon Rubinstein & Liav Orgad, Human Rights, State Security and
the Jewish Majority: The Case of Migration for Purposes of Marriage, HAPRAKLIT
315, 341-46 (2006) (Hebrew); HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality Government
in Israel v Knesset (awaiting publication, decision handed down on May 11, 2006),
para. 16, (decision of Justice Heshin) (Hebrew). For a contrary opinion, see Guy
Davidov, Jonatan Yovel, Ilan Saban & Amnon Reichman, State or Family? The
Citizenship and Entry to Israel Act (Temporary Order) 2003, MISHPAT U MIMSHAL
643 (2005) (Hebrew).
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